Do Fictions Explain? by Nguyen, James
Do fictions explain?
Accepted for publication in Synthese
James Nguyen∗
October 19, 2020
Abstract
I argue that fictional models, construed as models that misrepresent certain ontological as-
pects of their target systems, can nevertheless explain why the latter exhibit certain behaviour.
They can do this by accurately representing whatever it is that that behaviour counterfactually
depends on. However, we should be sufficiently sensitive to different explanatory questions, i.e.,
‘why does certain behaviour occur?’ vs. ‘why does the counterfactual dependency invoked to
answer that question actually hold?’. With this distinction in mind, I argue that whilst fictional
models can answer the first sort of question, they do so in an unmysterious way (contra to what
one might initially think about such models). Moreover, I claim that the second question poses
a dilemma for the defender of the idea that fictions can explain: either these models cannot
answer these sorts of explanatory questions, precisely because they are fictional; or they can,
but in a way that requires reinterpreting them such that they end up accurately representing the
ontological basis of the counterfactual dependency, i.e., reinterpreting them so as to rob them
of their fictional status. Thus, the existence of explanatory fictions does not put pressure on
the idea that accurate representation of some aspect of a target system is a necessary condition
on explaining that aspect.
Keywords: models, fictions, representation, explanation
1 Introduction
Suppose someone asks you why the difference between high and low tide, the tidal range, changes
throughout the lunar month. You might answer that it’s the relative positions of the sun, the
moon, and the earth which explain this difference. Depending on the lunar cycle, either the sun
and the moon are positioned in such a way as to ensure that their gravitational forces align,
thus producing spring tides (the tidal effect of the sun and the moon reinforce each other), or
their force vectors are at right-angles to one-another, thereby producing neap tides (the smaller
solar tidal effect is orthogonal to the larger lunar effect). Spring tides are higher (at high tide,
and lower at low tide) than neap tides, so during spring tides the tidal range is greater than
during neap tides. I think that this explains why the tidal range varies across the lunar month.
But there is a complication. This answer involves a ‘fiction’. There’s no such thing as
Newtonian gravitation. From our current perspective the ocean isn’t acted on by a gravitational
force; it’s just trying to ‘go straight in a crooked world’ (Bokulich, 2016, p. 273).1 Nevertheless,
it doesn’t seem detrimental to the model that it involves such a force, indeed involves such a
force essentially (without the force there is no such model and no explanation), and moreover
there doesn’t seem to be any scientific or philosophical pressure to attempt to replace the
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explanation based on the force model with one that doesn’t involve such a fiction, i.e., one that
made reference to the curvature of a spacetime manifold instead (if this could be done at all).
To a philosopher, this might seem puzzling. The model that explains why the tidal range
changes throughout the month seems to represent it as being induced by something that we
know isn’t there in the world. In this sense the model is an explanatory fiction. But how can
fictions explain? And if they do, do we need to develop a philosophical account of explanation
that gives up on the requirement that explanations are accurate representations?
I argue that this puzzle arises from two conflicting intuitions or observations. The first is
that accurate representation is necessary for explanation. The second is that fictional models,
which on the face of it are inaccurate in crucial respects, nevertheless provide explanations. In
this paper I show how this conflict can be dissolved. First by disambiguating the request for a
‘first-order’ explanation (in this case: ‘why does the tidal range vary across the lunar month?’)
from the request for a ‘second-order’ explanation (‘why does what explains such a variance play
the explanatory role that it does?’). Then, if fictional models are taken to provide first-order
explanations (only), they do so without being inaccurate in the relevant respects. Second, if
fictional models are also taken to provide second-order explanations (which is much less clear),
then we should reconsider their fictional status. A closer look at the explanatory uses of fictional
models will demonstrate that they do no conflict with the idea that accuracy is necessary
for explanation. So whilst this paper is framed in terms of whether or not fictional models
explain, its broader target is a defence of the idea that accurate representation is necessary for
explanation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I clarify two notions of ‘fiction’ that
have been invoked in the literature on scientific representation and explanation. I distinguish
between the sense of fiction as ontology (a work of fiction), and the sense of fiction as inaccu-
racy (fiction as misrepresentation). It’s the latter which is primarily relevant to the question
of whether or not fictions can explain in some philosophically interesting sense. In Section 3 I
introduce Bokulich’s (2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2011; 2012; 2018a; 2018b) account of model explana-
tion, which is explicitly designed to allow that (inaccurate) fictional models explain, and thus
puts pressure on the idea that accurate representation is necessary for explanation.2 The crucial
aspect of this account is that a model explains some phenomenon by accurately representing its
modal profile, i.e. how it would change were various other features to change (and that this can
be done even if the model inaccurately represents the ontology of the target). In Section 4 I
draw on a distinction between first-order and second-order explanations (cf. Skow, 2016, 2017),
and claim that Bokulich’s examples are ambiguous between them (in doing so I also show how
Skow’s distinction can be utilised without adopting his account wholesale). In subsection 4.1
I argue that (inaccurate) fictional models can offer first-order explanations of certain phenom-
ena, but they do so in such a way that their fictional nature doesn’t feature in the explanation
itself. In subsection 4.2 I pose a dilemma for a staunch defender of the view fictional models
can explain: either they can provide second-order explanations, but they do so because they are
interpreted such that they end up accurately representing the ontological basis of the counter-
factual dependency, i.e., reinterpreting them so as to rob them of their fictional status; or they
cannot provide such explanations, precisely because they are fictional, i.e., they are interpreted
literally and therefore misrepresent said ontological basis. Section 5 concludes by emphasising
that accurate representation, at least of both the features of the target that are to be explained,
the explananda, and the features that do the explaining, the explanantia, remains a necessary
condition on scientific explanation (or at least that fictional models do not challenge this).
2 Fictional models
At least some scientific models are fictions. What does this mean? For the likes of Godfrey-
Smith (2006), Frigg (2010), Frigg and Nguyen (2016a), and others, this is an attempt to analyse
the ontology of scientific models. The idea is that, ontologically speaking at least, scientific
2I focus on Bokulich’s work throughout since, to my mind, she provides the clearest expression of the tension
between fictional models in science and the role of accuracy in explanation. For other useful discussions of fictional
models see the papers collected in (Sua´rez, 2009a) and (Woods, 2010), and the references in Section 2.
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models should be thought of as akin to the situations described by works of fiction. Just as we
can talk about a farmyard populated by animals – a pig called ‘Napoleon’, a horse called ‘Boxer’,
and so on – who interact with each other in various ways – enacting different governing polices
and engaging in revolutions – we can also talk about fictional systems like idealised pendula,
celestial bodies subject to gravitational forces, and populations of animals with unlimited food.
Advocates of this view of fictional models urge us to think of the sorts of systems that are
described in scientific textbooks and research papers as akin to the sorts of systems that are
described in works of fiction.
Of course without an account of the nature of fictional situations, this approach risks
analysing the already confusing (what models are) in terms of something just as obscure (what
fictions are). Luckily, philosophers of science can appeal to various different accounts offered in
discussions of the ontology and metaphysics of fiction in order to cash out the analogy. Some pre-
fer to think that this means that scientific models are abstract artefacts created by humans but
existing as abstracta independently of us (Thomasson, 2018). Others adopt a more deflationary
view and take it to mean that scientific models are imaginary entities that are associated with
Waltonian ‘games of make-believe’ (Frigg, 2010; Frigg and Nguyen, 2016a). And in principle
any position concerning the nature of fictional entities could be utilised in service of developing
an account of what scientific models are, ontologically speaking.
However this is worked out, it’s crucial to note that when we shift from the ontological
question (what models are) to the semantic question (how they represent their target systems),
or functional question (what role they play in scientific practice, which is the focus of most
contributors to (Sua´rez, 2009a)), nothing in that version of the fictional account demands that
‘fictional’ models in this sense are in any way ‘false’ or ‘inaccurate’ representations of their actual
target systems. I believe that the world of Orwell’s Animal Farm is an accurate representation
of the political pressures faced by the USSR. But even if this is disputed (e.g. because the
Politburo didn’t convene in a farmyard), there are plenty of other works of fiction where the
situations described in the work are present in the real world too. For example, Cambridge, as
described in Faulk’s Englby, matches Cambridge in the real world, and the Dublin described in
Rooney’s Normal People matches the real Irish capital. Actual scenarios can be described in
works of fiction, and those scenarios needn’t be ‘false’ or ‘inaccurate’ representations of the real
world. Fictional models in this sense do not raise any novel explanatory questions.
However, ‘fiction’ has another reading, a reading that does connote inaccuracy. In this
sense it might be considered fictional that the audience at Donald Trump’s inauguration was
the biggest ever, or fictional that he won the biggest margin in the US electoral college since
Ronald Reagan. One way of understanding this sense of fiction is in terms of truth-values.
A sentence is fictional in this sense only if it is false, or alternatively if its truth-value is not
relevant to the function it is deployed for (Sua´rez, 2009b, pp. 11-13). In the context of model-
based science things are a little more complicated for two reasons. First, and most importantly,
following Weisberg (2007b), and indeed the majority of the contemporary literature on scientific
modelling, I characterise model-based science in terms of its indirect nature.3 As such, model
descriptions (which are linguistic) specify, or somehow describe, model systems, and it is the
latter that are the units that represent the target systems of interest.4 So on the indirect account,
model descriptions are, strictly speaking, not the ‘fictional’ items involved in the explanations:
their truth-values aren’t evaluated with respect to target systems; they’re evaluated with respect
to the model systems they specify and this isn’t at issue when it comes to how ‘fictional’
(inaccurate) models, or indeed any of kind of model, explain(s).
Since it’s the model systems that are the primary units of representation, how should we
understand them as providing ‘fictional’ (inaccurate) explanations? This depends on how the
model systems are understood as representations, which brings us to our second complication.
Model systems are not obviously truth-bearers.5 They represent their targets in a manner
3For dissenting voices see (Toon, 2010a,b, 2012; Levy, 2012, 2015).
4If we were to adopt the ‘fiction view of models’ discussed previously these models would be fictional scenarios,
but I am not committed to this analysis here, other options are that these model systems are mathematical structures
(Suppes, 1969; van Fraassen, 1980; Suppe, 1989; van Fraassen, 2008) or abstract objects (Giere, 1988).
5For a dissenting voice see (Ma¨ki, 2011).
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analogous to the way in which maps, or concrete models – such as the Phillips-Newlyn machine
(Frigg and Nguyen, 2018), ball-and-stick models of molecules (Toon, 2011), or the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers model of San Francisco Bay (Weisberg, 2013) – represent their targets. As
Giere (1994, p. 11) notes (with particular reference to maps), such representations ‘have many
of the representational features we need for understanding how scientists represent the world.
There is no such thing as a universal map. Neither does it make sense to question whether
a map is true or false’. So when models are fictional in the sense that Trumpian boasts are
fictional, rather than saying they are false, it’s better to say that such a model is an inaccurate
representation of its target.6
But here one might object that all models are inaccurate in some respect (Teller, 2001).
And if this is the case then all models are fictional in this sense. That doesn’t seem right.
Bokulich (2008a,b, 2011, 2012, 2018a,b) draws a distinction between models that introduce
kinds of entities, properties, states, or processes (‘features’ for short) known not to be present
in the target system, and those that distort the actual features of the target. The former are
appropriately dubbed ‘fictional’ models in the sense that they (seem to, see subsection 4.2)
inaccurately represent the kinds of ontological features present in the target system, whereas
the latter accurately represent the kinds of ontological features that are present, but do so in a
way that distorts their details.
Now, notice that these models do represent actual systems in the world, they just misrepre-
sent certain ontological features of those systems. As such, these models are ‘fictive’ in Sua´rez’s
(2009b; 2009c) sense, and should be distinguished from what he calls ‘fictional’ models, i.e.
representations of systems that don’t exist.7 Models that represent non-actual targets raise all
sorts of interesting questions (as do models that don’t represent any target whatsoever, non-
actual or otherwise (cf. Weisberg, 2013, Chapter 7)). However, if fictional models are to put
pressure on the idea that accurate representation is necessary for explanation, the puzzle is most
pressing when the thing that is to be explained is something in the actual world, not something
that itself doesn’t exist. Moreover, as we will see, Bokulich’s preferred examples of explanatory
fictions are precisely models that are targeted at actual systems (e.g. tidal behaviour). So from
now on I will use the term ‘fictional model’ to refer to a model which (i) represents an actual
target system; but (ii) misrepresents that system’s ontology. We can try to clarify this by (very
briefly) recapping the examples that Bokulich uses to illustrate her account.
Newtonian Tides
Bokulich (2016, Section V) cites the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
website for a standard explanation of the tides. The explanation is given by considering a
Newtonian model of the moon-earth system. The bodies in the model are assumed to revolve
together around their common centres of mass. They are held together by a gravitational
attraction force, and simultaneously kept apart by an equal (only at the centres) and opposite
centrifugal force resulting from their individual revolutions around their common centre of mass.
On the surface, i.e. not the centre, of the earth (in the model) there is an imbalance between
these forces: in the hemisphere of the earth closest to the moon (in the model) there is net
tide-producing force acting in the direction of the moon’s gravitational attraction, and on the
hemisphere opposite the moon there is a net tide-producing force acting in the direction of
the centrifugal force, i.e., away from the moon. These two forces result in two tidal bugles
on opposite sides of the earth (high tides). We can introduce a third body to our model, the
sun, which exerts an analogous differential force in its revolution around the earth-sun centre of
mass.8 However, since the tide-producing force (in the model) is inversely proportional to r3,
6Notice that the distinction draw by Sua´rez (2009b, pp. 11-13) in terms of thinking about fictions in truth-
conditional or functional terms, i.e. in terms of inaccuracy or in terms of the irrelevance of accuracy, carries over here.
We can also talk about fictional models in the sense that they have aspects whose representational (in)accuracy is
irrelevant to their function.
7So notice that, as a matter of unfortunate terminology, I’m using the term ‘fictional’ as he uses ‘fictive’, rather
than as he uses ‘fictional’. I address his work in subsection 4.2.
8We needn’t actually construct and calculate the details of a three-body model for the sort of explanation I am
concerned with in this paper.
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where r is the distance between the celestial bodies between which the force holds, and the sun
is further from the earth than the moon, despite its mass the sun exerts only half of the force
exerted by the moon on the earth resulting in a smaller tidal bulge.9 When the sun and the
moon are aligned their respective tidal bulges reinforce each other (spring tides), when they are
orthogonal to one another there is destructive interference producing neap tides. This is what
explains the variance in tidal range across a lunar month.
As Bokulich (2016) points out, force models are also used to explain vast numbers of other
complications that arise with the tides (why some areas only have one high tide a day, what
effect the depth of the ocean has on the tides, and so on). The crucial thing about all of these
models (Bokulich argues) is that gravity (in the model) is identified with a classical force. The
model’s gravitational forces are Newtonian; proportional to the masses of the objects involved
and the reciprocal of the square of their distance from one another. But, at least according
to general relativity, we know that gravity is actually ‘the curved geodesic structure of a 4-D
spacetime manifold whose metric is determined, in accordance with the Einstein field equations,
by the stress-energy tensor of the matter fields’ (Bokulich, 2016, p. 273). Gravity (in the world)
is not a classical force; it’s the curvature of spacetime. So gravity (in the model) is a fiction. It
doesn’t distort the known features of the target, the curvature of the manifold, it introduces a
new kind of feature, a force vector between bodies in the model, which we know isn’t actually
in the target system. This makes the model fictional.
Quantum Dot
Bokulich (2008a,b, 2011, 2012) draws on a wealth of examples from semiclassical physics both to
develop a novel understanding of the relationship between classical and quantum physics, and
to motivate her account of what fictional models are and how they explain (it’s more accurate to
say that she takes it for granted that these models explain and this requires developing a novel
philosophical account of explanation to accommodate them). Here I’ll focus on her discussion
of quantum dots (Bokulich, 2012), a specific kind of target system related to quantum scarring
(which is discussed throughout her work). A quantum dot is a semiconductor in which electrons
are confined to a very small 2D plane. When a quantum dot is weakly coupled to external
leads there is the possibility of an electron tunnelling into the dot. At certain voltages one can
compensate for the Coulomb repulsion of the electron already in the dot, and the charge in the
dot will fluctuate between N and N + 1 electrons, resulting in a series of peaks in the dot’s
conductance. In order to understand the patterns of conductance we construct a model which
matches the shape of the dot (and includes the the external leads and so on), and investigate
which classical orbits would be allowed within the dot. Because of the dot’s irregular shape
the classical system is ergodic, which means almost all of the trajectories are not periodic. But
there is an (infinite, but measure 0) set of unstable orbits which are periodic, and it’s these that
correspond to the peaks in the conductance of the dot:
the period of modulation of the Coulomb-blockade peaks is determined by the periods
of the classical orbit that intersects with the leads, the frequency of the oscillations is
proportional to the area covered by the orbit, and the peak distribution is determined
by the Lyapunov exponent of the classical orbit (Bokulich, 2012, p. 729).
The model thus represents the patterns of conductance of the dot as being determined via
the voltage and position of the external leads, understood quantum mechanically in terms of
the initial conditions of an electron’s wavefunction, and the shape of the dot itself (in terms
of which of its internal orbits are periodic). However, the model does so by invoking the idea
that electrons within the dot follow classical orbits, something we know isn’t the case. In fact,
the pattern of conductance peaks, and indeed quantum scarring more generally, is known to
actually be determined by complex interference patterns in the electrons’ wavefunctions, which
are themselves properly thought of as spread out throughout the dot. So classical orbits (in the
9It’s worth noting here that the tide-producing force (in the model) is inversely proportional to r3 even though the
gravitational force (in the model) is inversely proportional to r2. This is because the former concerns the difference
between the forces at various positions on the earth’s surface.
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model of the dot) are a fiction. The model doesn’t distort the known ontology of the dot, the
wavefunction, it introduces a novel kind of feature, electrons following classical orbits, which we
know isn’t actually present in the target system.
So what these case studies demonstrate is that fictional models (seemingly, again see sub-
section 4.2) misrepresent the ontological features present in a target in a way that involves in-
troducing novel kinds of features – Newtonian forces, classical orbits – known not to be present
in the target system. In contrast, idealised models that are not fictions should be analysed in
terms of distorting the features known to be present. For my current purposes this suffices to
distinguish what I mean by fictional models.10
Now, whilst there are various treatments of the epistemic capabilities of idealised models that
distort known target features (e.g. McMullin, 1985; Jones, 2005; Weisberg, 2007a; Strevens, 2008;
Nguyen, 2019), the question of how fictional models, models which invoke features known not to
be present, work has not, to the best of my knowledge, been explicitly addressed in these terms
(beyond Bokulich’s work). And it’s these sorts of models that seem to pose a particularly novel
kind of philosophical puzzle. If a fictional model M of some target system T represents T ’s
behaviour as being generated by a completely different ontological feature of T than the one we
know is actually present, then how can M play an explanatory role? In contrast, representing
T ’s behaviour as being generated by some feature of T that we know is there, but inaccurately
representing the way that the feature generates the behaviour, seems to pose a different and
(possibly) less threatening kind of puzzle (or at least a puzzle that many authors have already
attempted to address). The aforementioned models are cases in point. The Newtonian model, if
interpreted literally, represents the differences in tidal range as being determined by the relative
positions/masses of the sun and the moon with respect to the earth, via the gravitational
forces of each on the latter. The quantum dot model, if interpreted literally, represents the
conductance patterns as being determined by the initial conditions (e.g., the shape of the dot),
via the periodic classical orbits that they allow. But we know that there’s no such thing as
gravitational force and that electrons do not follow classical orbits. So how do these models
explain? Before addressing that question it will prove useful to specify what it means for a
model to explain. That is the task of the next section.
3 Model Explanation
What it means for models to explain is a thorny topic. For my current purposes I’m focusing
on models that explain via representing certain counterfactual dependencies that hold in the
target. It’s important to note that I’m not claiming that this exhausts all kinds of model
explanations.11 For my current purposes what matters is just that some models explain via
representing dependencies, and that some of these models appear to be fictional in the sense
discussed in the previous section. In the first instance it’s these kinds of model explanations
that seem to threaten the idea that explanation requires accurate representation. So in order
to get a handle on how fictional models explain it’s useful to analyse cases where the notion
of explanation is as straightforward as possible, to ensure that we keep in focus the fictional
aspects of models that play such explanatory roles. As such we can set aside the complications
that arise from more exotic forms of model explanations.
Bokulich (2008a,b, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2018a,b) develops an account of model explanation that
is explicitly geared to allow for fictional models to explain in this way. The account involves
10I’m not claiming that there is a strict clear distinction here. One might be able to reinterpret the distortion of
a known feature as the introduction of a new (non-actual) ontological feature, and vice versa. This strikes me as
analogous to the fact that we can reinterpret cases of abstraction (e.g. a model that ignores friction) as idealisation
(e.g. a model that misrepresents a friction coefficient as 0) (Jones, 2005). However, I do think we have enough of a
pre-theoretical grasp of the fiction/non-fiction distinction to motivate the rest of the discussion.
11For example I’m leaving it open that: models can explain by providing comparison cases (Kennedy, 2012; Jebeile
and Kennedy, 2015); by demonstrating that previously held necessity or impossibility hypotheses are false (Gru¨ne-
Yanoff, 2009); by demonstrating various features of the theories in which they are embedded (Luczak, 2017); via
renormalisation group transformations (Batterman and Rice, 2014); and other forms of non-causal explanation (Reut-
linger and Saatsi, 2018), and that models might offer these kinds of explanation in a manner that doesn’t involve the
representation of counterfactuals.
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three main claims: first, the explanation must make essential reference to a scientific model;
second,
that model explains the explanandum by showing how there is a pattern of coun-
terfactual dependence of the relevant features of the target system on the structures
represented in the model. That is, the elements of the model can, in a very loose
sense, be said to ‘reproduce’ the relevant features of the explanandum. Furthermore,
as the counterfactual condition implies, the model should also be able to give infor-
mation about how the target system would behave, if the structures represented in
the model were changed in various ways (Bokulich, 2008a, p. 226; cf. Bokulich, 2011,
p. 39).
And third, the model explanation must satisfy a ‘justificatory step’ that specifies what the
domain of applicability of the model is, and shows that the phenomenon in the real world to be
explained falls within that domain.12
My primary focus here is on the second condition (although I return to the third in subsection
4.2). Drawing on (Woodward, 2003), Bokulich argues that this condition requires that models
explain in virtue of answering ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions, or w -questions.13 As
Woodward puts it, such an explanation provides ‘information about a pattern of counterfactual
dependence between explanans and explanandum’ (2003, p. 11), and:
an explanation ought to be such that it can be used to answer what I call a what-
if-things-had-been-different question: the explanation must enable us to see what
sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the
explanans had been different in various possible ways. We can also think of this as
information about a pattern of counterfactual dependence between explanans and
explanandum (ibid.).
The conclusion that Bokulich draws from this, combined with her case studies as evidence, is
that a model can answer w -questions even whilst misrepresenting the ontology of the system,
i.e., being a fictional model. If correct, this would seem to put pressure on the idea that an
accurate representation is a necessary condition for explanation.
The problem, however, is that when stated like this, the counterfactual condition doesn’t
fully specify the relationship between the ‘things which could have been different’ and the
fictional aspects of the model. In particular, I think that this condition is ambiguous between
two different readings, and as we will see, it’s this ambiguity which makes the fact that fictional
models can explain seem mysterious.
The first reading can be specified as follows. We will say that: a model M explains a
target’s behaviour, A (the explanandum), only if M accurately represents A and accurately
represents the counterfactual dependency of A on some other target feature, B (the explanans).
More precisely, taking care to keep reference to features of the model and features of the target
distinct:
Counterfactual Model Explanation Condition: for a model M of a target T, where T has
a feature A which can take values in {A1, A2, ..., An}, M explains A only if M has a feature
P which can take values in {P1, P2, ..., Pn′}, P accurately represents A, M has a feature
Q which can take values in {Q1, Q2, ..., Qm′}, Q accurately represents some feature in the
target B which can take values in {B1, B2, ..., Bm} and the dependencies of the values of
P on the values of Q accurately represents how the values of A depend on the values of
B.14
12Bokulich (2018b, p. 143) offers a fourth condition to allow for multiple explanations of the same explanandum. I
agree with this condition. I won’t talk about it here.
13Bokulich departs from Woodward in not spelling this condition out in terms of manipulability or intervention.
This is deliberate in the sense that it is supposed to allow her account to capture non-causal explanations. For
discussion of this aspect of her account see (Saatsi and Pexton, 2013; Schindler, 2014). For my current purposes I’m
focusing on how it works when the explanations in question are causal, but this doesn’t make too much of a difference
to the issues I’m discussing.
14Although this condition is phrased as a necessary condition, I restrict its scope to cases where models explain
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In the simplest case we might have bijections between each of these sets of values in such a way
that specifying a value Qi in the model serves to both represent a value of Bj , a feature in the
target, and also fixes a value of Pk in the model such that Pk accurately represents the value
Al in the target that would arise were Bj the actual value of B in the target.
15 So, in order
for a model to explain some behaviour A of the target system, it needs to accurately represent
that behaviour, the explanandum (via the feature P of the model), and accurately represent the
explanans of that behaviour B (via the feature Q of the model), in the sense that the model
accurately represents how A would change, were B to change.16
I take it that this captures what Bokulich means when she says that in cases of model
explanation ‘we require that the counterfactual structure of [the model] be isomorphic in the
relevant respects to the counterfactual structure of [the phenomenon to be explained]’ (2011, p.
39, 43) (she admits that she is using isomorphism in a loose sense), and that in cases of model
explanation ‘the elements of the model can, in a very loose sense, be said to ‘reproduce’ the
relevant features of the explanandum’ (Bokulich, 2008a, p. 226; cf. Bokulich, 2011, p. 39).17
Moreover, I take it that this is suggested in discussions such as the following:
the semiclassical model allows one to answer a wider variety of w -questions about
how the system would behave if certain parameters were changed-and provides this
information without having to explicitly carry out the tedious quantum calculations
for each possible case (Bokulich, 2008a, p. 233),
and when citing (Narimanov et al., 2001):
the semiclassical model allows physicists to answer a wide range of what-if-things-
had-been-different questions. As Narimanov et al. write, from this model they
now understand “how as a system parameter varies [such as] the magnetic field,
for instance, or the number of electrons in the dot ([as] controlled by varying a
gate voltage) - the interference around each periodic orbit oscillates ... When the
interference is constructive for those periodic orbits which come close to the leads
used to contact the dot, the wavefunction is enhanced near the leads, the dot-lead
coupling is stronger, and so the conductance is larger” (2001, 2) (Bokulich, 2012, p.
731).18
In the case of the Newtonian model of the tides both the explanandum, A: the tidal range in
the target, and the explanans, B : the relative positions and masses of the sun, moon, and earth,
are accurately represented by the model. (If you’re concerned that gravity isn’t in the explanans
here, bear with me for now; this is addressed below.) Such a model works to explain the tidal
range because it specifies how the tides would vary were the positions/masses of the celestial
bodies varied (I don’t just mean ‘vary’ in the sense in which they follow their orbits, the model
also works to specify how the tides would vary if the bodies were in positions outside of their
orbits too, or different masses). In the case of the quantum scarring model, again, both the
explanandum, A: the patterns in the conductance peaks that are observed, and the explanans,
B : the initial condition of the system, including the parameters referenced by Narimanov et al.
(2001) in the above quotation, are accurately represented by the model.
The models in question then provide answers to w -questions, where the things that could
have been different are the positions/masses of the celestial bodies, or the initial conditions of
the wavefunction (for example). Notice though, that when described in these terms, the model
by accurately representing a target’s counterfactual behaviour. I’m open to other ways in which models can perform
explanatory roles, cf. fn. 11.
15By ‘simplest case’ I mean simple in the sense of simple to philosophically analyse, not simple in the sense that
the explanation is scientifically simple.
16It’s worth noting here that I’m allowing the variables A and B to range over observable and unobservable features
of the target system. I’m grateful to Juha Saatsi for encouraging me to be explicit about this.
17This is also how Fang (2019) interprets her account.
18Here I assume that the ‘parameters’ referred to in these quotes are parameters of the target system of interest
actually has, whether or not its in a magnetic field, the shape of the quantum dot, the initial conditions of the
wavefunction, the voltage, the resulting pattern of conductance peaks, and so on. Another interpretation of this
phrase is offered below.
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in question is an accurate representation of both the explanans and the explanandum in each
case: in particular, neither model is fictional with respect to either the positions of the celestial
bodies, or the initial conditions of the wavefunction (and both models accurately represent the
target of the explanation, the tidal range and conductance peaks respectively).
There is, however, another reading of Bokulich’s second condition of model explanation.
Recall that she requires that ‘the model should also be able to give information about how the
target system would behave, if the structures represented in the model were changed in various
ways’ (Bokulich, 2008a, p. 226; cf. Bokulich, 2011, p. 39). The question is: what does the phrase
‘the structures represented in the model’ refer to? Under one reading (the one just discussed),
it refers to whatever it is that the relevant target behaviour counterfactually depends upon.
But under another reading it refers to the whatever it is that underpins this counterfactual
relationship, which in the models in question correspond to their fictional aspects. Under this
reading the model answers w -questions where the things that could have been different are
fictional: if gravitational force had been proportional to r4 rather than r2, or if the classical
orbits within the quantum dot had been different. This reading is also suggested at various
points throughout Bokulich’s work:
this pattern of dependence allows one to say precisely how the quantum wave-function
morphology would change if, for example, the classical periodic orbit had been dif-
ferent, or if the Lyapunov exponent of that same orbit had taken on another value
(Bokulich, 2008a, p. 227; cf. Bokulich, 2008b, p, 157)
and
Bohr’s model is able to correctly answer a number of ‘what-if-things-had-been-different
questions,’ such as how the spectrum would change if the orbits were elliptical rather
than circular (Bokulich, 2011, p. 43).
Under this alternative reading, the explanatory questions being answered by the model are
different. The question is no longer the first-order ‘why does T exhibit A?’ (that question is
answered by a model accurately representing A’s dependence on B). The question is now the
second-order ‘why does T ’s behaviour A depend on B?’ The latter kind of question is now
answered by the following:
Second-Order Model Explanation Condition: M explains A’s dependence on B (in the
target) only if M accurately represents that A depends on B (in the target) (by meeting the
Counterfactual Model Explanation Condition) and has a feature R that accurately
represents whatever target feature C, it is that A’s dependence on B itself depends upon.19
In the case of the tidal model, again A is the tidal range and B is the relative positions
and masses of the sun, moon, and earth, but the explanandum has shifted. Now, rather than
trying to explain A itself, a model that meets the second condition attempts to provide an
explanatory answer to the question ‘why does A depend on B ’ and the explanans given invokes
R, the gravitational force (in the model) that is supposed to represent whatever it is that
provides the basis for the counterfactual dependency of A on B (and in the model, does in fact
provide the basis for the counterfactual dependence of P on Q). Similarly, in the case of the
quantum scarring model, the model no longer attempts to explain A, the conductance patterns,
via representing its dependency on B, the initial conditions, but rather attempts to explain why
A depends on B. And it does so by invoking R, the classical orbits that are supposed to represent
whatever it is that provide the basis for why A or more generally, quantum scarring, depends
on B. Let’s now investigate the distinction between first-order and second-order explanations
and w -questions in more detail.
19For the cases relevant here C will itself be another aspect of the target system. But as I discuss in the following
section this might not be the case for explanations in general.
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4 Levels of explanation
Once we grant that models explain by answering w -questions, we can distinguish between dif-
ferent kinds of w -questions in a way that corresponds to two different kinds of explanatory
questions that models can answer:
First-order :
i ‘Why does T have behaviour A?’
ii M explains T ’s having A only if M accurately represents A’s counterfactual depen-
dence on feature B of the target (Counterfactual Model Explanation Condition)
iii M provides answers to what-if-B-had-been-different questions.
Second-order :
i ‘Why does A depend on B?’
ii M explains why A depends on B only if M accurately represents C, which A’s depen-
dence on B, itself depends on (Second-Order Model Explanation Condition).
iii M provides answers to what-if-C -had-been-different questions.
The shift from a first-order explanation to a second-order explanation concerns the explana-
tory depth of the model in question. There are at least two ways of thinking about ‘explanatory
depth’. First, one could consider a ‘chain’ of causes (or dependencies): one explains something
by representing its cause, and then provides more explanatory depth by representing the cause
of the cause, and so on. Another way of thinking about explanatory depth however, is to explain
why the initial explanation explains in the way it does. In this case, one explains something by
representing its cause (or dependencies), and then provides more depth by explaining why the
causal relationship initially invoked holds in the way that it does. Figuratively, the first kind of
explanatory depth concerns extending a chain of dependencies, the second concerns providing
more detail about a section of the chain itself. It is the latter that I’m interested in in here.
The explanans provided by a model to a first-order question becomes the explanandum of the
second-order question: if a model answers the question ‘why A?’ with ‘A depends on B ’, then
this first-order explanans becomes the second-order explanandum, whose explanans is an answer
to the second-order question ‘why does A depend on B?’.20 With this in mind we can now turn
to how the fictional models discussed above answer first-order and second-order explanatory
questions.
4.1 Fictions and first-order explanations
I hope by now it is straightforward to see how the Newtonian model of the tides and the quantum
dot model provide first-order explanations for tidal behaviour and the patterns of conductance
respectively. They do so by accurately representing those features of their targets, and what it is
that they counterfactually depend on, namely the positions/masses of the sun, moon, and earth,
and the initial conditions of the wavefunction in quantum dots. Now the crucial thing to note
here is that although the models are fictional (in the sense that they misrepresent their targets
in certain ways), and although these fictional aspects play an essential role in the first-order
explanations they offer (without them we wouldn’t have the models that represent the relevant
dependencies), the fictional aspects themselves don’t feature in the first-order explanations. The
models explain by representing how changes to the explanans yield changes to the explananda,
and they do so accurately despite the fact that in the model the features which represent these
aspects of the target are connected to each other via a feature (gravity, classical orbits) that
itself misrepresents the features of the target. In both cases, the model provides an explanation
of the behaviour A by answering certain w -questions: namely, questions of the form ‘what would
20This distinction loosely matches Skow’s distinction between what he calls first-order and second-order reasons for
some phenomena (Skow, 2017, p. 907; cf. Skow, 2016, Chapter 4.2), although note that I’m talking about explanations
rather than reasons, and I’m not attempting to provide a ‘universalist’ account of explanation; I’m focusing on cases
where the explanations in question are given in terms of causal counterfactuals, without claiming that this is how all
explanations have to be given.
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happen to A if B were different?’. These answers explain A by showing how it depends on B.
And when answering these questions, the fact that the model contains fictional elements, in
the sense of inaccurately representing what underpins the counterfactual dependence, which
plays an essential role in generating the explanation – since the fictional elements mediate
between P and Q in the model, which respectively accurately represent A and B in the target
– the misrepresentation does not feature in the explanation itself, since it concerns A and
B alone. In this sense, the models are not fictional with respect to the explanans, B, they
accurately represent those features of their targets, and how varying those features impacts the
explanandum (which is also accurately represented).
Now, notice that these explanations do not provide answers to questions like: ‘what if gravity
had been different?’, or ‘what if classical orbits had been different?’. These latter w -questions,
and their potential answers, seem to, at least on the face of it, concern what if the features
of the models were different, rather than what if features of the targets were different. If the
models are supposed to provide first-order explanations by answering ‘why A?’ questions by
invoking the fact that A depends on gravity, or classical orbits, one shifts from talking about
A, to the feature of the model, P , that (accurately) represents A in the target. Of course one
can answer ‘why P?’ with ‘P depends on R’ in the model – in the case of the tidal behaviour in
the model, it depends on the gravitational force in the model, and in the case of the patterns of
conductance in the model, they depends on the classical orbits in the model – but it is unclear
what these answers are supposed to refer to if we are talking about the behaviour of the target
itself. After all, we know that Newtonian gravity isn’t part of the ontological furniture of the
world, and we know that electrons aren’t the sorts of things that follow classical orbits. Thus,
if we ask what if these features were varied, we’re no longer talking about the target systems
in question. So, whilst Bokulich is right that fictional models can offer first-order explanations,
this observation in itself is not philosophically novel, and more importantly, doesn’t put pressure
on the idea that in order to explain a certain phenomenon a model has to accurately represent
it and (at least some of) its dependencies.
However, let’s suppose for the time being that this is the only explanatory role that they play
(in particular, let’s suppose that they don’t successfully answer the second-order explanatory
questions). I want to highlight that even if this is the case, this observation goes relatively
far in capturing the true but unspecific claim that these fictional models are, in some sense,
explanatory. In particular, I want to highlight that by playing this first-order explanatory role,
the models already take on a status beyond being ‘phenomenological models’ or ‘calculation
devices’, at least where these monikers are used in a pejorative sense (see Bokulich, 2008a, p.
227; Bokulich, 2008b, p. 138; Bokulich, 2011, p. 44-45; Bokulich, 2012). There are three things
to note in this regard.
First, in their aforementioned roles, the models in question are not just used to simply calcu-
late the value of their behaviour, A, in some particular case. Both the Newtonian model of the
tides and the quantum scarring model provide a wealth of counterfactual information between
their respective behaviour (A: tidal behaviour, conductance patterns) and what it depends on
(B : the positions/masses of celestial bodies, the initial conditions of the wavefunction and the
shape of the quantum dots); they don’t just represent particular values of A, they represent
how these values change with values of B. Second, neither of these models answer the first-order
explanatory questions in a way that involves them being constructed via an ad hoc fitting of
the model to the empirical data (Bokulich, 2011, pp. 44-45). Third, neither of these models
are ‘independent of theory’ in any way that would justify calling them ‘phenomenological’ in
that sense (McMullin, 1968). The Newtonian model of the tides obviously draws upon New-
tonian mechanics, and as Bokulich discusses extensively, the quantum dot model, and models
of quantum scarring more generally, draws on a rich interplay between classical and quantum
theory (and with respect to this aspect of her discussion I am in complete agreement). These
considerations, I think, show that the models in question are not just calculation devices. They
do provide explanations, albeit first-order ones. However, if this is all they do, there is the worry
that:
they do not purport to give us any genuine insight into the way the world is. An
explanatory model, by contrast, does aim to give genuine insight into the way the
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world is (Bokulich, 2011, p. 44, italics added).
Of course if what I argued above is true, they do give us genuine insight into the way some
aspects of the world are (the relationship between A and B). However, one might still worry
that they do not exhibit ‘enough’ explanatory depth; even though the model might explain A
by representing its modal profile with respect to B, this may strike some as a relatively ‘shallow’
explanation.21 So the next question is whether or not they give us genuine insight into another
aspect of the way the world is (why A and B exhibit the dependency they do). And this brings
us to the question of whether or not the fictional models have the explanatory depth to answer
second-order explanatory questions.
4.2 Fictions and second-order explanations
Recall the second-order questions relevant to the explanations offered by the fictional models
discussed in this paper:
Q1: Why do the tides depend on the positions/masses of the celestial bodies?
A1: Because the celestial bodies exert a certain classical force on one another.
Q2: Why do the patterns of quantum scarring depend on the initial conditions of the wave
function, the shape of the quantum dot, and so on?
A2: Because electrons follow classical trajectories.
The way that the models answer Q1 and Q2 respectively is by invoking a reason why the
dependencies in the target system behave the way they do. The answers invoke a basis for
the counterfactual dependencies. These play the role of R (which is supposed to accurately
represent C ) in the Second-Order Model Explanation Condition. The problem is that
in the case of fictional models, R (seems to) inaccurately represent the actual basis of the
counterfactual dependencies in the model: the proposed explanans isn’t present in the target.22
It’s not gravitational force that determines why the target tides depend on the positions/masses
of the target celestial bodies, it’s rather to do with the curvature of the spacetime manifold
(and we know that this is the case). Of course there is a relevant counterfactual dependency
in the model between gravity and the relationship between the tides and the positions/masses
of the target celestial bodies. There is also a relevant counterfactual dependency in the target
between spacetime curvature and the relationship between the tides and the positions/masses of
the target celestial bodies. But the dependency in the model is not the same as the dependency
in the target (the former stems from gravity as a force, the latter from spacetime curvature).
It’s not classical orbits that determine why the target conductance peaks or different quantum
scarring patterns arise in different set ups of quantum dots, it’s interference patterns in the
electrons’ wavefunctions which are spread out throughout the dot (and again, we know that this
is the case, and the respective dependencies in the model and target are mismatched).
So how should we think about how the models answer the second-order w -questions, like
‘why do the tides depend on the positions/masses of the celestial bodies’? If the answers concern
what-if-gravity-had-been-different, or what-if-the-classical-orbits-had-been-different, what is the
relevant feature in the world that is varying? Presumably it’s not gravity, or classical orbits,
since we know that the former isn’t an ontological feature of our world, and we know that
electrons aren’t the sorts of things which follow classical orbits. Of course we can vary the
values of gravity, or classical orbits, in the model. But when we’re asking w -questions, we’re
not (primarily) interested in what if things had been different in the model, we’re interested
21Obviously the request for explanatory depth cannot be pushed indefinitely: at some point one has to accept that
a model cannot answer every explanatory question about a target. But nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to ask
whether the models in question provide more than the first-order explanations presented here.
22Or alternatively the explanans given is inaccurate. Which reading one prefers here depends on whether one prefers
to adopt an ontic or epistemic account of explanation, i.e. whether or not one prefers to think of explanans as things
in the world, or our representations of such things. This is relevant to how to phrase the puzzle I’m discussing here,
in terms non-existent explanans or inaccurate explanans, but beyond this it doesn’t matter too much for my current
purposes. See (Illari, 2013) for a useful discussion.
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in what if things had been different in the target. In fact, it’s precisely the fact that these
features (those I have labelled R) in the models in question seem to misrepresent what’s actually
going on (features I have labelled C, in the cases in question these are spacetime curvature and
wavefunction interactions) that makes the models fictional in the first place (recall the discussion
in Section 2).
So, under this reading there is no explanans to vary, and thus these models don’t successfully
answer second-order explanations of the relevant counterfactual dependencies, because they
misrepresent those dependencies. We can ask what-if-R-had-been-different questions about the
model, but in order to generate the second-order explanation, we need answers to what-if-C -had
been different. And if R is what makes the model a fiction, in the sense of misrepresenting the
ontology of C, it is not obvious how these latter questions can be answered, and thus no second-
order explanation is provided (I take it that Bokulich agrees with this, since because ‘gravity’ and
‘classical orbits’ aren’t features of the targets, they do not enter into counterfactual dependencies
with other features of the targets, tidal range and the behaviour of the dot, which is, by her
own lights, what is required for explanation). So, and this is the first horn of the dilemma for
the defender of the idea that fictional models explain qua fictions: they don’t provide second-
order explanations precisely because they are fictional in the relevant sense (and thus the only
explanations that they do provide, the first-order ones, are not misrepresentations).
However, an account of explanation according to which such models fail to provide second-
order explanations is fairly conservative. One might argue that the Newtonian model doesn’t
just explain the tidal range, it also explains why the tidal range depends on the positions/masses
of the relevant celestial bodies, despite, or even in virtue of, the fact that a purported explanation
offered by the model invokes forces that we know don’t exist. One might claim that the model of
quantum dots doesn’t just explain the conductance patterns, it also explains why those patterns
depends on the shape of the dot and the initial conditions of the set up, despite, or even in virtue
of, the fact that this explanation invokes the idea that electrons travel in classical orbits. One
might demand a more liberal account of explanation in order to allow for the pre-theoretical
intuition that such models don’t just offer first-order explanations by accurately representing
counterfactual dependencies of the target system, they also provide second-order explanations of
the counterfactual dependencies themselves even though they misrepresent the ontological basis
that gives rise to them.23 I admit, when I’m feeling particularly open minded about explanation
I feel the pull of this in certain cases.
Whilst Bokulich is not explicit about the precise explanatory questions that the models she
investigates can successfully answer, I think when pressed she would agree that they can provide
successful second-order explanations, since it’s precisely here where their fictional nature seems
to lead to the philosophical question concerning how fictional (in the sense of misrepresenting)
models can explain.24 As we have seen, whilst the fictional features of the models in question
play an instrumental (but essential) role in generating the relevant first-order explanations,
they do not feature in those explanations themselves, which only make reference to the modal
profile of the explanans and explanandum, which are accurately represented by the models in
question. So if the presence of fictional models in science is supposed to challenge the idea that
explanation requires accurate representation, then we should turn to whether or not the fictional
elements themselves play a direct explanatory role.25 The next step then is to investigate how
these models can play such a role, which requires investigating the relationship between their
23It’s not clear to me that this pre-theoretical intuition should be granted, especially since it can be explained away
by the idea that it is motivated by a confusion between first-order and second-order explanations, i.e. because such
models provide first-order explanations we expect them to provide second-order explanations too. But why expect
that?
24Although this may depend on the details of the case. For example, in her (2011, p. 44) she writes ‘Bohr’s model
does genuinely explain the Balmer series, though the explanation it offers may not be as deep as that offered by
modern quantum mechanics, and moreover, the explanation offered by modern (nonrelativistic) quantum mechanics
may not be as deep as that offered by quantum field theory’, suggesting that she grants that, in at least some cases,
fictional models may not provide deep, i,e. second-order, explanations.
25An alternative possibility, which I discuss in the conclusion, is that these fictional elements feature in some
alternative first-order explanations. However, as I argue there, for them to do so, they still have to be interpreted in
such a way as to rob them of their fictional status.
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fictional aspects (R features), and the actual ontology of their targets (C features). It’s here
where Bokulich faces the other horn of the dilemma: these models can provide second-order
explanations, but to do so involves reinterpreting them as not being fictional; interpreting them
in such a way that they don’t radically misrepresent the ontological basis that generates the
relevant counterfactual dependencies, or so I will argue. This undercuts the philosophically
novel aspects of her discussions in the sense that it blunts the threat that explanatory fictional
models might have on the idea that accurate representation is necessary for explanation.
Recall the distinction between fictional and non-fictional idealisations discussed in Section 2.
Non-fictional idealisations were taken to accurately represent the ontology of their targets, but to
distort that ontology in a way that didn’t involve representing the target as having some feature
known not to be present in the target. Fictional models misrepresented the very ontology present
in the target system. The puzzle arises if fictional models are taken to provide second-order
explanations whilst misrepresenting what it is that actually underpins the relevant dependen-
cies. In the case of the tidal model, there are Newtonian forces in the model which determine
the counterfactual dependencies of the tides (in the model) on the celestial positions/masses
(in the model). And it was assumed that the model thereby represented counterfactual depen-
dency of tidal behaviour in the target on the celestial positions/masses (in the target) as being
determined by Newtonian forces. Thus, the model is fictional and yet still provides what might
feel like a successful second-order explanation despite not meeting the Second-Order Model
Explanation Condition (in virtue of misrepresenting the counterfactuals’ ontological basis).
But, just because those forces are present in the model, it needn’t be the case that the model
represents those forces as being present in the target. Just because a model has some feature
doesn’t mean it represents its target as having that feature, any more than statue being made
of bronze represents its subject as being made of bronze.
This brings us to the topic of how models represent. It’s commonplace in the literature on
scientific representation that there is a central role for model users in interpreting which features
of their models play a representational role, and indeed what proposed target features those
model-features are supposed to represent (for reviews of this literature see Frigg and Nguyen,
2016b, 2017, 2020). According to Frigg and Nguyen (2016a, 2018) models come with ‘keys’
that specify which features of a model are associated with which features the model exports
to the target system. According to Sua´rez (2004, 2015), models represent their targets only
if they allow competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences about their targets.26
According to Hughes (1997), models are such that results obtained by ‘demonstrations’ on the
model can be ‘interpreted’ in terms of their targets. What all of these accounts have in common
is that the inferences that a user draws about the target can, but need not, be of the form ‘the
target has similar features to the model’; that is, they needn’t be of the form ‘if a model has
a relevant feature P , the target has P ’ (or a feature similar to P ).27 The ‘key’ that connects
model features with features to be exported to their targets, or the inferences/interpretations
made by competent and well informed agents, may allow for a mismatch between model-features
and features that the model represents the target as having, whilst still allowing for accurate
representation of those latter features. A caricature of a person with a large nose doesn’t have
to represent its subject as having a large nose. In the appropriate context the large nose plays
the role of representing the target as a liar, or as having a nosey character (cf. Elgin, 2017,
Chapter 12). In these cases the key takes a feature of the representation and transforms it into
another to be exported to the target. Or alternatively, the competent and well informed agent
26Here I’m assuming that the competent and well informed agents use some sort of inferential rule to draw these
inferences. I take it that these rules correspond to what (Sua´rez, 2010) describes as the ‘means’ of representation.
In keeping with Sua´rez’s ‘deflationary’ way of thinking, I’m not assuming that these rules, or means, are the same
across all instances of scientific representation, just that in the relevant cases in question, they allow competent model
users to infer truths about their targets from features of the models that don’t match features of their targets. For
example, just because, in the Newtonian model, the dependency of tidal behaviour on celestial positions depends on
gravity, a competent and well informed agent needn’t use the model to infer that in the world the dependency of tidal
behaviour on celestial positions depends on a classical gravitational force, they can infer that the former dependency
itself depends on something else (i.e., to preempt what’s to come, spacetime curvature).
27See in particular (Frigg, 2006) and (Sua´rez, 2003) for arguments against thinking about representation in terms
of similarity.
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knows to interpret the the feature of the caricature – having a large nose – as representing a
different feature of the target, namely that s/he is a liar. Either way, the feature of the model
isn’t carried over to the target directly, there is a mismatch between the model-features and the
feature the model represents the target as having.
One way of putting this is that the representational content of a model is a function of both
the model-features and the key or inferential rules used to interpret it. With this in mind, just
because Newtonian gravity is a feature of the model this doesn’t mean that it is part of the
representational content of the model. The key or rule that is used to interpret the model, when
applied to the features of the model involving fictional forces, can translate them to entirely
different features to be exported to the target. And the representational content of the model
will involve the claim that the target has the exported features rather than the model-features,
just as the representational content of the caricature is that the person is a liar or has a nosy
caricature, rather than having a large nose.
Now, earlier I said that a model was a fiction if it misrepresented the ontology of the target
in such a way as to represent the target as having features which we know are not there. But as
applied to the Newtonian model of tides, that relied on the idea that the model represented the
counterfactual dependence of tidal variance on celestial positions/masses in the target as being
determined by gravitational forces. But the model doesn’t have to be, and in fact, I argue,
typically isn’t (these days), interpreted that way. One way of interpreting the model is to ex-
plicitly not export gravitational forces to the target, but rather to export something like ‘being
determined by spacetime curvature in such a way that the effect will approximate the effect of
classical gravitational forces’. As far as I can see, even once we accept that the gravitational
model offers a first-order explanation in terms representing the tides’ counterfactual depen-
dence on the positions/masses of the sun, earth and moon, the intuition that the gravitational
model additionally provides a second-order explanation of why tidal variance depends on these
positions/masses, is not because it represents the actual tides as being determined by Newto-
nian gravitational forces, but rather because our interpretation of the model is embedded in a
broader theoretical framework where we know that at the appropriate speeds and masses any
actual system will by approximated by a Newtonian system. So, suitably interpreted, the model
doesn’t represent the relevant tidal counterfactual relationships as being determined by Newto-
nian gravity, but represents them as being determined by something which is approximated by
Newtonian gravity in the appropriate regimes.28
The same applies to the quantum dot model. Rather than exporting ‘the electrons follow
classical orbits’, we export ‘the electrons’ quantum behaviour is approximated by those classical
orbits’. Again, if we want the quantum dot model to provide a second-order explanation, it
is not because it represents the actual electrons as classical objects, but rather because our
interpretation of the model is embedded in a broader theoretical framework relating quantum
and classical physics in a semiclassical way. In fact, in both cases, it’s because the models
are embedded in the theoretical frameworks in which they are (i.e., we know how to connect
the, if literally interpreted then inaccurate, models, with theories that we take to be accurate),
that the models can be seen to provide second-order explanations. And what these connections
allow for is the possibility of providing the interpretations that explicitly do not export the
(inaccurate) ontological bases for the counterfactual behaviour in question, but rather export
the actual ontology of the system with the proviso that it is approximated by the model’s one
in the appropriate regimes.29
28To further motivate this claim, it might be useful to think of a world where we hadn’t discovered general relativity,
but we nevertheless knew that gravitational forces didn’t exist in the Newtonian sense. In such a world I take it that
the key sketched here wouldn’t be applied to the model. Therefore, I think that in such a world the model wouldn’t
explain the second-order question of why tidal variance depends on the positions/masses of the earth sun and the
moon (although I still think it would explain tidal variance itself). Turning this point on its head, we can consider
the impact of the discovery of inter-theory relations between relativistic and Newtonian theories. My claim here is
that such discoveries can contribute to the explanatory power of Newtonian models, in virtue of impacting how they
are interpreted.
29At this point one could ask yet another explanatory question: why does the actual ontology approximate the
ontology of the model? Here I take it the answer would be provided by the connections between the theoretical
frameworks in which they are embedded.
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In a sense then, my argument here is in agreement with Sua´rez’s treatment of ‘fictive’
models (2009c).30 As noted at the beginning of this subsection, according to his account of
representation, models have to licence inferences about their targets. And in the case of fictive
models, these inferences can have true conclusions, even though the models and their targets
are not similar, or isomorphic, to one another in the relevant sense. However, in such cases, the
sense in which the models should be considered fictive is no longer obvious. Even though the
descriptions used to present those models, if evaluated with respect to the target system rather
than the model, are false (or are such that their truth-value is irrelevant to their function), it
doesn’t follow that the ‘fictive’ models themselves should be considered misrepresentations of
the relevant aspects of their targets. In the context of the indirect view of modelling, these
descriptions should not be evaluated with respect to the target system; they serve to describe
the model, and the question is how the model represents (recall the discussion in Section 2).
And in fact, on the natural way of understanding these models, interpreted in the manner I
have discussed, they are no longer ‘fictive’ in the sense that they no longer misrepresent the
features of the targets they licence inferences about, since the inferences they end up licensing
are, in the relevant cases, true.
Returning back to Bokulich, so far I have been suppressing a crucial aspect of her account
of model explanation, a condition that is highly relevant to the question of the ways in which
fictional models explain. She has another condition on model explanation; a justificatory step
that specifies ‘what the domain of applicability of the model is, and show[s] that the phenomenon
in the real world to be explained falls within that domain’ (Bokulich, 2008b, p. 226). In the
current context I’m going to interpret this step as a justification for how (some) fictional models
can provide second-order explanations (the step could also reasonably be interpreted in terms
of providing first-order explanations but I have already discussed that above). In the case of
fictional model explanations she claims that this justificatory step is performed in a ‘top-down’
manner; the relevant theories involved (in the cases in question these theories include classical
mechanics and general relativity, and our understanding of the relationship between the two, and
classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, and our understanding of the relationship between
the two offered by periodic orbit theory) specify that the models in question are applicable to
the target systems in question (Bokulich, 2008a, p. 239; Bokulich, 2008b, p. 146; Bokulich,
2011, p. 39; Bokulich, 2012, p. 736; Bokulich, 2016, pp. 273-274). Since we’re in the business
of talking about application in terms of second-order explanations, it seems like the best way of
interpreting how they do this is to accept that they provide information about how variances
in R correspond to variances in the actual ontology (C ) of the system, thereby allowing us to
translate between what-if-R-had-been-different-questions-and-answers and what-if-C -had-been-
different-questions-and-answers, where R is the ontological basis of the counterfactuals in the
model and C is the ontological basis of the counterfactuals in the target.
This point, that fictional models can be interpreted via a key, or inferential rule, which
translates their ontological basis into a different ontological basis to be exported to the target,
is made in Bokulich’s own discussion of how the quantum dot model explains:
the theory of semiclassical mechanics provides physicists with what we might call a
well-defined translation key, whereby statements about classical trajectories can be
translated into true conclusions about the actual morphology of the wave function
of the quantum dot. Note that the translation key given by semiclassical mechanics
[...] is not from the empirical predictions generated by the fictions to the empirical
predictions generated by the true description [...] Rather the translation key is from
statements about the fictions to statements about the underlying structures or causes
of the explanandum phenomenon (Bokulich, 2012, p. 735).
But once she accepts this, then in combination with the aforementioned way of thinking about
scientific representation, she undercuts her own claim that fictional models explain qua fictions.
And this pulls the rug from under her project of developing an account of scientific explana-
tion which drops the idea that accurate representation is necessary for explanation.31 Once the
30I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to be explicit about this.
31There are other philosophical projects where the same reasoning applies. See (Frigg and Nguyen, 2019) for a
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fictional models are interpreted in this way, they are no longer fictions in the sense of misrep-
resenting the ontology of their targets. These translation keys or inferential rules specify the
representational content of the models. And if one thinks that the models can generate success-
ful second-order explanations, then a key or rule needs to be in place according to which the
models don’t misrepresent said ontology. By paying due attention to the ways in which compe-
tent and informed model users draw inferences from models to their target, or alternatively, the
keys that accompany them, either of which is in part generated by the theoretical context in
which they are embedded, models that explain the basis of the causal dependencies in question
need no longer be seen as fictional.32
This, I think, poses a dilemma for a staunch defender of the view that fictional models can
explain. The dilemma concerns whether or not they can answer second-order explanatory ques-
tions. If they can’t, I think this is precisely because they are fictional in the specific respect
at issue. If they can, I take it that the details of such an explanation require reinterpreting
them so as to ensure that they don’t misrepresent the ontological basis for the counterfactual
dependence. Either way, once the explanatory question is suitably specified, there is no philo-
sophical puzzle concerning how a fictional misrepresentation of some target feature can explain
that specific feature of the target.
5 Conclusion
Before concluding then, it is worth revisiting the role of fictions in first-order explanations.
Recall that a model provides a first-order explanation of some target behaviour A only if it
accurately represents A’s modal profile with respect to some explanans B. In the discussion
in subsection 4.1, I argued that in the explanations in question, those explanans were things
like the positions/masses of the celestial bodies, and the initial conditions of the quantum dot,
features that the models also accurately represent (when interpreted literally). However, it’s
plausible that the features that were the explanans in the second-order explanations discussed
in the previous section (e.g. spacetime curvature, which approximates Newtonian gravity in the
appropriate regime), can also feature in first-order explanations as well.33
One could think about this in two ways. First, one could argue that without invoking
‘gravity’ or ‘classical orbits’, the first-order explanations discussed in subsection 4.1 are unsat-
isfactory: yes tidal range depends on the positions/masses of celestial bodies but only because
the positions/masses make a difference to gravitational attraction, and thus gravity cannot be
excluded from those first-order explanations. This is suggested, for example, by Bokulich herself
who states that physical oceanographers ‘are interested in how gravity interacts with other fac-
tors to produce the complex tidal phenomena that they are trying to explain and understand’
(Bokulich, 2016, p. 273). Without understanding how the positions/masses of the celestial
bodies interact with gravity, they do not provide a sufficient first-order explanation. Second,
and relatedly, one could argue that ‘gravity’ and ‘classical orbits’ themselves provide us with
first-order explanations. After all, we might also be able to use the model to answer questions
like ‘how would changes to “gravity” affect the tidal positions?’, and thus also invoke ‘gravity’
as an alternative first-order explanation to the tidal range.
discussion of how the possibility of interpreting models in a non-literal manner blunts the need for an epistemology
of science based on the idea that models provide ‘felicitous falsehoods’, rather than truths (cf. Elgin, 2017). Saatsi
(2019) provides a useful discussion of related issues in the context of thinking about scientific realism.
32It’s worth briefly mentioning how this aspect of my discussion relates to Schindler’s (2014) criticism of Bokulich’s
account. In the terminology of this paper, he argues that because the ‘top-level’ theories allow us to generate the
actual ontological counterfactuals involving C from the model’s counterfactuals involving R, Bokulich requires an
additional argument ‘for why it is the model, rather than quantum mechanics [or in the case of the tides, presumably
general relatively], which does the real explanatory work’ (Schindler, 2014, p. 1747). Here I am in agreement with
Bokulich that fictional models can still play a crucial explanatory role; just because the models require interpretation
via the theories in question, this doesn’t mean that the theories themselves, without the fictional models, would suffice
to generate the explanations offered by the models even when the latter are interpreted via an appeal to the theories.
See (Bokulich, 2008a, pp. 232-233; Bokulich, 2008b, Chapter 6) for argument to this effect.
33I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point.
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With respect to the first claim, I take it that whether or not the positions/masses of the
celestial bodies suffices for a first-order explanation depends on the level of explanatory depth
required by the context. If the first-order explanation isn’t sufficient, and one demands to know
why the tides depends on the celestial positions/masses, then one is, in effect, demanding a
second-order explanation. But notice that this is not to say that in contexts where the first-order
explanation is sufficient, that the fictions don’t appear at all. As I have discussed throughout,
the fictional aspects of the model are still essential in the generation of the explanation, because
they play an essential role in structuring the counterfactual dependencies in the model, they
just don’t feature in the content of the explanation itself (cf. Lawler, 2019). With respect to the
second claim, that the fictional aspects of models may themselves provide alternative first-order
explanations, notice that in order to make sense of the counterfactual dependency of the tidal
range on ‘gravity’, in the sense of answering questions concerning how the tidal range (in the
world) would differ were gravity to differ, we would also have to interpret ‘gravity’ (or more
accurately, the gravitational force in the model) in a non-literal way. As previously discussed,
asking how the tidal range would change were (Newtonian) gravity different, amounts to an
infelicitous shift between talk of the target and talk of the model. If we are to talk solely in
terms of the target, then, to be precise, we have to ask how the tidal range would change, were
what in the target that approximates Newtonian gravity in the appropriate regimes to change.
And again to answer these sorts of questions the models have to be interpreted in such a way
that they are not misrepresentations. So, if the fictional elements of models are taken to provide
first-order explanations, then they can only do so by being interpreted in such a way that they
are no longer fictional in the relevant respects.
To conclude. I have argued that fictional models, in the sense of models which appear to
misrepresent the ontology of their target systems (rather than distorting the actual ontology),
can explain certain kinds of features of their targets’ behaviour. Namely, I have argued that
a fictional model can explain a certain target feature by accurately representing whatever it
is that the feature counterfactually depends on. For these kinds of explanations, the fictional
aspects of the model play an essential role in generating the explanation, but do not feature
in the explanation itself. However, I have argued that there is a second kind of explanatory
question that one might also think fictional models can answer. It’s in answering these sorts
of questions that I think the real philosophical puzzle concerning fictional models comes to the
fore, and I have suggested that either fictional models should not be taken to successfully answer
such questions, precisely because they are fictional, or if one thinks that they do offer these sorts
of explanations, then they do so in a way that robs them of their fictional status.
The crucial take home message of this paper then is that fictional models qua fictions –
i.e., interpreted in such a way that makes them drastic misrepresentations of their targets –
do not explain those features that they misrepresent, again precisely because they are fictional.
However, if they are interpreted differently, by competent and well informed agents, using a key
that allows for model-features to be associated with the actual features of the target, then they
can play such an explanatory role, but this undercuts the idea that they are fictional (at least
in the way that Bokulich uses the term). So the puzzle that seems to arise from models which
drastically misrepresent the ontology of their targets, and yet still appear to be explanatory,
dissolves. If I am right, then the existence of explanatory fictions in science gives us no reason to
give up on the idea that the accurate representation of some target feature remains a necessary
condition on explaining that specific feature.
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